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ABSTRACT 
Studies on formal-informal interactions in the labor markets of developing countries 
claim that economic reform increases the level of informal activity. Although the extent of 
such claims differs across countries, it is generally believed that reform is likely to depress 
informal wage by contracting the formal sector and driving labor onto its informal 
counterpart. However, available empirical evidence suggests that real wage and real fixed 
assets in the informal manufacturing sector have risen significantly across most states in 
post-liberalization India. Using this as a benchmark, we formalize a general equilibrium 
model of inter-sectoral capital mobility and informal wage to argue that, with limited degree 
of capital mobility, trade reform reduces the informal wage. This is the conventional wisdom 
usually obtained under a partial equilibrium framework. However, with increased mobility of 
capital this result is reversed. We offer detailed empirical evidence on the movements of real 
wage in the informal sector in India and how this affects poverty at the state level. The basic 
result on income mobility is corroborated by a primary survey in the province of West 
Bengal, for which we offer descriptive analysis on household income levels in the province’s 
informal manufacturing and service sectors. 
Keywords:   Informal Wage, Capital Mobility, Trade Reform, Poverty, India 
JEL Classifications:  F13, F16, O17, J21, J31 3 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the analytical implications of liberal trade 
policies on the real wage of informal workers. The term ‘informal sector’ as initially coined by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1972) refers to, ‘‘illicit or illegal activities by 
individuals operating outside the formal sphere for the purpose of evading taxation or 
regulatory burden.’’ It may alternatively be defined as ‘‘very small enterprises that use low-
technology models and do not refer to legal status’’ (Webster & Fidler, 1996). Although 
dominantly, informal sector activity pertains to non-traded items in the economy - from small 
retailers and street vendors to domestic helps - in many developing countries they produce 
exportable and import-substitute goods either independently or through subcontracting with 
the formal sector. In its own right, the informal sector has become an institution in all 
developing and transition countries, generating with it various positive and negative 
implications effects (For example, Davis, 2006 argues that division of labor becomes greater 
than optimal in the presence of informal institutions, resulting in greater than optimal 
complexity and higher growth in the economy). 
On an average, about 70 percent of the labor force in the less developed countries 
(LDCs) belongs to the informal sector. Data from Southeast Asian, East European, African, 
and Latin American countries show varying rates of urban informal sector employment 
ranging from 15 percent to 20 percent in Turkey and Slovakia to 80 percent in Zambia, and 
even to about 83 percent in Myanmar. Moreover, considering the state of agricultural and 
rural activities in these countries, it is quite apparent that the total share of the informal 
sector in the economy as a whole would be very high (ILO, 1999). This is corroborated by 
some other studies such as Turnham (1993), which provides evidence that in low-income 
countries like Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, India, and elsewhere, the share of the urban 
informal sector to the overall economy is at least as high as 51 percent. The informal labor 
market, characterized by competitive wage formation rather than a unionized process of 
negotiations, has subsequently emerged as an important institution in the entire developing 
world. Agenor (1996) and references therein provide ample evidence testifying on the 
predominance of informal labor markets in the entire developing world.  
Alternatively, seen from the point of view of the ‘minimum wage’ earners, only 11 
percent of Tunisia’s labor force is subject to minimum wage; in Mexico and Morocco, a 
substantive number earns less than the minimum wage; in Taiwan, minimum wage is less 
than half of the average wage, and so on (Agenor, 1996). Interestingly, in the so-called 
informal sector many workers earn even less than the minimum wage, typically because the 
existence of non-market clearing downward rigid wages along with other corporate taxes 4 
pushes many private firms to operate in the informal sector (see Gang and Gangopadhyay, 
1990 for further discussion and evidence on this). 
The case of India offers a glaring example in this context. An overwhelmingly large 
proportion (approximately 93%) of the industrial and service sector workforce in India is 
employed under informal arrangements. A substantial portion of such employment 
opportunities is generated in the urban or semi-urban areas and, not surprisingly, a majority 
of this workforce is economically marginalized. The high incidence of poverty among these 
groups, exposure to difficult and hazardous working conditions, non-existent social security 
or health benefit schemes other than poorly functioning state-provided medical facilities, 
among other things, is quite common. Contrary to conventional belief, it is also witnessed 
that despite economic prosperity private firms and recently even public organizations are 
entering into informal employment contracts, where workers receive contractual tenures and 
wages, with no access to various benefits that earlier generations of workers enjoyed. The 
dwindling labor union presence in many institutions has also contributed strongly in favor of 
such hiring practices.  
While these refer to informal practices within the formal institutions, a larger group of 
workers face more pervasive informalization, with enormous implications on aspects of 
income volatility, poverty, and standard of living for all those inside and outside the informal 
segment. Given the economic trends in most developing countries, it is inconceivable that 
the size of the informal sector would shrink considerably below the existing level and 
therefore, sustained improvements in the living standards of these groups can only be 
brought about by capital accumulation, productivity gains, and wage increases in this sector. 
While there are several mechanisms that can generate such positive economic 
impact for the existing group, here we argue that one of the crucial factors in this category is 
the degree of capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors. The motivation 
behind invoking the issue of capital mobility comes from the observation that several 
developing countries have been experimenting with policies on trade reform for quite some 
time, where the critical feature has been the contraction of the formal protected industries, 
either via import liberalization or through state initiatives in withdrawing support from loss-
making public enterprises. This implies that a large amount of capital and labor that were 
earlier part of these industries would now have to relocate to a more profitable venture. It 
should be noted that in most of these countries, the vacuum left by the vanishing large-scale 
public industries has been filled not by similar manufacturing units, but by a predominantly 
service-oriented industrial structure which faces less stringent labor laws and industrial 
regulations. Moreover, the new opportunities that have emerged in the so-called sunshine 
industries are incapable of accommodating the retrenched capital and labor, a larger share 5 
of which has hence been devoted to less formal applications. There may be several 
explanations for this transition, among which include the fact that workers in typical import-
competing public or private enterprises would not find an easy access to the more formal 
service industries. These require high-skilled professionals with certain technical expertise, 
which the old industries rarely employed. 
Furthermore, this would mean that an assessment of the success of trade reform in 
poor countries is incomplete without an explicit account of the welfare of informal workers 
and of capital owners who have relocated to riskier and supposedly more profitable 
businesses. Obviously, the principal concern in this context is the economic return an 
informal worker receives when more such workers are involuntarily retrenched from the 
formal sector and crowd into the informal counterpart. In fact, a critical stance against 
downsizing an artificially bloated and subsidized formal sector is supported by the argument 
that such downsizing will drive labor into the informal sector, lowering wages and forcing 
workers to survive in poorer working conditions. If one assumes diminishing marginal 
productivity of labor, a larger work force, ceteris paribus, must mean lower real wage. This is 
the usual partial equilibrium response one should expect. However, the general equilibrium 
outcomes could be quite different. For example, if the displaced workforce is accompanied 
by fresh investments in the informal sector, existing informal workers are likely to gain. In the 
present paper, we argue why mobility of capital is essential for understanding fully the 
implications of economic reform on the large informal sectors in the developing world. In 
particular, this paper also tries to establish that, despite contraction of the formal sector and 
relocation of labor into the informal segment, the informal wage can still rise if the degree of 
capital mobility exceeds a certain critical level.  
2.  Literature Review and Specific Objectives 
Both theoretically and empirically, this paper highlights the role of capital mobility 
between the formal and the informal sectors in determining the direction of the informal 
wage, when the formal segment is adversely affected by liberal trade policies. The 
theoretical aspect offers distinct departures from the traditional literature that uses the 
Harris-Todaro type structures to model the informal sector (for example, Fields 1975; Gupta, 
1993, 1997; etc.)  However, problems with the Harris-Todaro framework are now well known 
(Basu, 1984; and Majumdar, 1976, 1983), and a major critique of the framework is that open 
unemployment among the poor workers is far less plausible than conjectured, since 
remaining unemployed for long involves severe costs for such groups. Therefore, it is quite 
likely that they settle for any jobs, which are mostly located in the informal sector. When the 
sector faces an excess supply of such workers, a crashing of wages (rather than 
unemployment) is the more feasible outcome.  6 
Using this very realistic phenomenon in the developing world, our theoretical 
framework uses a full-employment model, where wage in the formal sector is set at a high 
level by unionized bargaining while the informal segment faces a low flexible wage. The 
theoretical inspirations behind this framework are drawn from Carruth and Oswald (1981), 
Agenor and Montiel (1996), Kar and Marjit (2001), Marjit and Beladi (2002) and Marjit 
(2003), etc. 
Furthermore, unlike previous studies, here we bring in imperfections in the allocation 
of existing stock of capital between formal and informal manufacturing. Albeit the informal 
sector may not use up a vast amount of capital itself because of inadequate property rights 
or due to the absence of contractual protections, there is evidence of some degree of inter-
sectoral mobility of capital.
1. Essentially therefore, we model the mobility of capital explicitly, 
which depends on return differential and the inability of capital to relocate affects the 
accumulation process in the informal segment. If capital is guaranteed of a protected return 
in the formal sector, it hardly has any reason to flow out to the informal sector. However, as 
the protectionary shelter is withdrawn, capital relocates where it continues earning the 
highest returns. In certain cases, such movements could be a lengthy process and quite 
costly, depending on existing institutional arrangements. 
The empirical basis of our theoretical work is drawn from the evidence on informal 
wage and capital accumulation in the informal manufacturing sector in India. We use various 
rounds (1984-85, 1989-90, 1994-95, 1999-00 and 2000-01) of National Sample Survey data 
to demonstrate that: (1) the real informal wage for the non-directory manufacturing 
enterprise (NDME) has increased between the pre-reform and the post-reform decades; (2) 
real capital stock in the organized manufacturing has remained stagnant or declined in real 
terms vis-à-vis real fixed assets in the informal sector, which has grown substantially in the 
post-reform period; (3) for a majority of the states and union territories in India, the growth of 
real informal wage is significantly explained by growth of real fixed assets and real value 
added in the informal sector. 
While we are not building up a model to explain the movement in the real informal 
wage in India, our theoretical work highlights the case of rising informal wage in accordance 
with a rising capital stock in the informal sector. We argue that if trade reform reduces the 
output of the import-competing product and subsequently drives labor to the informal sector, 
the informal wage tends to rise only when a ‘critical’ amount of capital also relocates to the 
informal sector alongside labor. In a static general equilibrium model this is captured by a 
                                                 
1 Earlier, De Soto (1989) pointed out that a heavy burden of taxes, bribes and inflexible bureaucratic 
regulations in the formal sector drives many producers into the informal sector; and similar arguments 
in Gang and Gangopadhyay (1990). 7 
greater allocation of capital in the informal sector and a simultaneous decline in the capital 
stock in the formal counterpart. While direct empirical evidence can hardly capture this 
mobility, we use proxy estimates to demonstrate that there have been phases in post-reform 
India when capital in the organized manufacturing sector did not grow at all. However, during 
the same periods, real fixed assets – a true measure of capital stock in the informal sector – 
grew substantially. We use this evidence as a plausible foundation for our theoretical 
propositions. 
Our paper has a strong policy implication. If inter-sectoral capital flow is severely 
restricted by institutional and other factors, downsizing of the formal segment will be harmful 
to the vast majority of informal workers. Excess supply of labor in the informal sector must 
be accompanied by adequate investments in this sector in order for informal workers to 
benefit. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. The third section develops 
the theoretical model. The fourth offers empirical evidence on the direction and growth of 
informal wage in India, while Section 5 provides implications for the state of poverty in 
different Indian states. Section 6 concludes. 
3. The  model 
We assume a two-sector small open economy. X is produced in the formal 
manufacturing sector and Y is the informal manufacturing sector. Both X and Y use labor 
and capital. Wage in the formal segment is fixed through bargaining. Initially, X is protected 
either through a tariff or by a state subsidy, which artificially increases the price of X. Trade 
reform or withdrawal of subsidy implies a decline in the tariff/subsidy rate, denoted by t. 
Workers who do not find jobs in the formal sector flock in sector Y where they receive the 
market determined wage rate. We call this the informal wage. There is no open 
unemployment in this model. People must find jobs to survive, and wage in the informal 
sector adjusts fully to accommodate workers moving into the sector. Markets are competitive 
and technology exhibits CRS (constant returns to scale) and diminishing marginal 
productivity. 
The model is similar in spirit to Agenor and Montiel (1996), Carruth and Oswald 
(1981), Marjit and Beladi (2002) and Marjit (2003). Capital and land are fully employed. 
The symbols we use are given as follows: 
w :  Formal unionized wage;   w:  Informal (flexible) wage 
i r :  Return to capital in sector i;   X :  Output of formal sector; 8 
Y :  Output of informal sector  ) , ( Y X P P : Exogenous commodity prices 
L :  Supply of Labor;  K :  Total supply of capital 
i K :  Supply of capital in sector i.;  : ) , ( LY LX a a   Per unit labor use in X and Y. 
: ) , ( KY KX a a  Per unit capital use in X and Y;   t:  Tariff rate or subsidy. 
‘^’ represents percentage changes for particular variables, and symbols used bear the same 
implications as in Jones (1965). 
Competitive price equations that describe the system are given by, 
) 1 ( t P a r a w X KX X LX + = +      (1) 
Y KY Y LY P a r wa = +      (2) 
Commodity prices are given from the rest of the world. Let us suppose Y is exported 
and X is imported.  
Full employment conditions imply:    
L Y a X a LY LX = +      (3) 
K K K Y X = +     
     (4) 
    X KX K X a =     
     (5) 
  Y KY K Y a =      (6) 
Let w ˆ  be so determined that,  
Y X P P w ˆ ˆ ˆ β α + = ,   1 , 0 < < β α           ( 7 )  
Finally, the capital mobility condition: 
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Equation (8) suggests the following. At any point in time K  is allocated between X 



















 describes the relative supply of 9 
capital in sector X. The usual way to model this is to assume sector-specific capital for X and 
Y without any mobility, with  0 = ′ φ . Perfect mobility will always imply  X Y r r =  and there is no 
relevance for a separate sectoral supply function of capital. Relative supply adjusts to 
demand in each sector, which is the standard Heckscher-Ohlin structure. We shall 
demonstrate that our comparative static depends on the curvature of  0 = ′ φ .  
Given  ) , ( Y X P t P + ,  w , L, and K, we have w,  Y X r r , , X, Y,  Y X K K ,  to solve from (1)-
(6) and (8). The determination of general equilibrium proceeds as follows. From (1) we can 
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As  Y r  increases, given  X r  and  0 > ′ φ ,  Y K  must rise. This defines the relationship 












LX = + − ) (           ( 9 )  




 is given. Now as  Y r  increases, from (2),  w
r Y
 must 




 must rise as well. Hence in equation (9) the LHS unambiguously increases. To 








, LHS must 
decrease with a decline in  Y K . Such an assumption implies that the informal sector is labor-
intensive; an assumption by virtue of being realistic is kept all through the paper. Therefore 
as  Y r  rises,  Y K  must fall. This defines FF in figure (1). Once  ( Y r , Y K ) are determined from 
Figure (1), the rest of the variables can be determined easily. 
The key comparative static exercise we are interested in is a decline in ‘t’. Figure (1) 
helps us to trace out the consequences of both. A decline in t reduces  X r , given w  and  X P . 
Given  Y r  a drop in  X r  increases  Y K , as  0 > ′ φ . This will mean a rightward shift of MM to 
M M ′ ′ .  





 and therefore LHS in 
(9) declines. The balance is restored through an increase in  Y K  at a given  Y r . FF shifts to 10 
the right as well. The way figure (2) is drawn suggests that Y must expand. But  Y r  may 
remain unchanged and can in fact go either way. Note that if MM shifts quite a bit relative to 
FF,  Y r  will decline and w will increase. The mobility effect has to be significant for a positive 





 releases labor to Y sector, which implies that FF 
shifts up requiring more  Y K  to accommodate displaced labor. Additional capital that comes 
to Y because  X r  is lower must outweigh the required amount needed to absorb displaced 
labor at a given  Y r , hence at a given w to induce an increase in w. With zero mobility MM is 
vertical and remains unchanged. Hence,  Y r  must increase and w must decrease through a 
shift in FF. With perfect mobility MM is horizontal at  X Y r r =  and as  X r drops, MM shifts 
down. Notwithstanding the shift in FF,  Y r  must adjust to the new level of  X r and w must 
increase. Figure (3) describes the effects of such adjustments. 
The above two cases explicitly demonstrate the partial and general equilibrium 
results that can be derived from this model. In figure 2, the vertical line MM represents 
perfect immobility of capital between the formal and the informal segments. Under the 
circumstances, formal job losses and crowding in of workers into the informal sector leads to 
wage cuts in the latter. The situation undergoes a complete reversal if capital is perfectly 
mobile and is represented by a horizontal line MM (figures 2 and 3). Retrenchments from the 
formal sector and additional job creation in the informal sector could even lead to a wage 
gain for the informal workers, thus establishing the general equilibrium implications of our 
model. 
Finally, the precise condition for  0 >
dt
dw
 is derived by following the above 
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2 See Appendix I for detailed algebraic proof. 
3 Condition (10) offers a directly testable hypothesis. However, it requires matching data on product 
specific capital stock in both formal and informal sectors, and the return such capital fetches in each 
sector. Annual Survey of Industries in India offers data on formal commodities until 1997 only, and 
reliable data on the return to capital in the informal sector is unavailable. Thus, we set aside this direct 
exercise for a future effort and instead use a proxy measure for present requirements. 11 
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4.  Empirical Evidence for India 
This section concentrates on the relationship between inter-sectoral capital mobility 
and the real informal wage by looking at the available Indian data for the pre-reform (pre 
1991-92) and post-reform periods. To this end we choose three factors that can potentially 
explain the growth of informal wage for different states in India, namely, Real Fixed Asset 
(FA) in the informal sector, Real Value Added (VA) in the informal sector and the Real Rural 
Wage  (RW). Previously, it has been discussed (Kar and Marjit, 2001) that the workers 
migrating from the rural areas cannot afford to wait indefinitely in the urban sector for a 
potential job opening, and instead join the urban informal sector for lower wages. When 
wages are high in the rural area they tend to migrate back. Informal employment and thus 
informal wage in the developing countries are strongly influenced by such seasonality of 
rural-urban migration. We therefore use rural wage as an exogenous variable in explaining 
trends in urban informal wage. 
The empirical investigation involves a choice of five strategic time periods over the 
last two decades in India. We begin by calculating the annual growth rates of informal real 
wage and the explanatory variables between five data points: 1984-85, 1989-90, 1994-95, 
1999-00 and 2000-01.
4 Comparison between the first two data points gives us an idea on 
the pre-reform growth rates. 1989-90 to 1994-95 mark the transition through the trade reform 
period and 1994-95 to 1999-2000 capture the immediate post-reform situation. The period 
between 1999-00 and 2000-01 is useful for observing the matured impact of trade reform on 
informal wage. Unavailability of a continuous time series restricts our choice to this five-point 
data set. 
As already mentioned, we assume imperfect capital mobility between the formal and 
the informal sectors, which essentially means that following a contraction in the formal sector 
some capital may be relocated to the informal sector.
5  In our example, the capital 
reallocation occurs between the formal manufacturing sector and the non-directory 
manufacturing enterprises in the informal sector.
6  However, this is a proxy for measuring 
                                                 
4 Secondary data on Informal sector activities in India is available from intermittent (usually every five 
year) sample surveys by NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization), Government of India.  
5 Interest rate cuts in the commercial banks along with high volatility and lack of trust on the 
functioning of the stock exchanges might have contributed substantially to such capital flight for 
supporting informal activities. While this requires further evidence and more detailed analysis, it is 
also believed that a large section of the retrenched labor has used their early retirement benefits and 
severance pays as startup capital for small businesses. Undoubtedly further research is needed to 
track the relocation path for such capital stock deterministically. 
6 This is not to preclude the possibility that formal industrial capital may relocate to say, services 
within the formal sector. However, the overwhelming fixed assets formation in the informal sector 
along with falling capital stock in the formal suggests that a large portion of the investments previously 13 
capital relocation between the sectors and we use the growth of real fixed assets in the 
informal sector as an explanatory factor for growth of the real informal wage. Finally, we use 
the real value added in the informal sector to see if that has sufficient explanatory power 
behind increases in the real informal wage. Obviously, the starting point of this analysis is 
the observation that the real informal wage has increased unambiguously in most states and 
union territories
7 in India, after the onset of trade liberalization. We provide this evidence in 
table 1 (in Appendix II), initially for 15 major states and after 1989-90 for 30 states and union 
territories. Finally, we check for existence of structural breaks between the pre and post-
reform periods for the annual growth rates in informal wage. 
Following the plan of empirical study, we begin by providing observations on the 
annual growth of real wage, real VA and real FA (in 1989 prices) for the informal sector as 
well as that of the real rural wage across different states and union territories in India. Due to 
incompleteness of the data, we calculate the real growth rates for only 17 states during 
1984-85, and expand the set to include 30 states and union territories for 1989-90, 1994-95, 
1999-2000 and 2000-01. Table 2 (Appendix II) offers detailed descriptive statistics for the 
variables under consideration and Table 3 shows that any substantial problem of multi-
collinearity among the variables does not exist. 
The first of the three explanatory variables, informal fixed assets (real FA) grew at a 
temperate rate between 1984-85 and 1989-90 for many states (Fig. 5, Appendix II), although 
the states of Assam (AS), Haryana (HY), Kerala (KE), Tripura (TR) and West Bengal (WB) 
registered negative growth of informal real fixed assets during this period. However, during 
1989-90 and 1994-95, immediately after the reforms took effect in India, informal fixed asset 
shows high growth rate in many of the states. Once again, Bihar (BH), Himachal Pradesh 
(HP), Lakshadweep (LA), Meghalaya (ME) etc., report negative growth. Between 1994-95 
and 1999-2000 informal fixed assets grew positively (10% to 150%) for 29 out of 30 
locations in India, with the exception of Manipur (MA). The pattern, however, seems 
dampened for many states during 1999-00 and 2000-01. 
The second explanatory variable real Value Added (VA) also registered a negative 
trend for all states except Gujarat and West Bengal during 1984-85 and 1989-90. It 
undergoes a turn around in the post reform period, when most states and union territories 
show significant increase in the value added. Finally between 1999-00 and 2000-01 it 
reports negative growth rates in many states.
8 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the formal sector has flown in to the informal segment, especially when the total savings in India 
has not changed significantly. 
7 Regions directly administered by the central government.  
8 Data and trends for this variable are available on request. We do not explicitly report them here.  14 
Third, real RW denotes the real growth rate of rural wage. It shows negative growth 
rates for all the states between 1984-85 and 1989-90, which change to positive growth rates 
between 1989-90 and 1994-95 for majority of the states. However, this was not sustained, 
since between 1994-95 and 1999-00 relatively more states like TR, Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands (AN), SI, Jammu and Kashmir (JK) etc., once again record negative growth in rural 
wage, which continues to later periods.  
The dependent variable in our model, the growth rate of real informal wage (IW) 
shows a negative growth for all the states between 1984-85 and 1989-90 (see Figure 4 and 
Table 1). The trend shifted substantially in favor of informal workers in the period 
immediately following the introduction of economic reforms in India. All the states including, 
GJ, MH, OR (22%), TN, RJ (32%), AP (38%) showed significant positive annual growth in 
informal wages. Between 1994-95 and 1999-00, twenty-nine out of thirty locations, except 
WB (-2%) show moderate positive annual growth of informal wage and the post reform 
average annual growth in informal wage is recorded at between 15-20 percent with a 
variance of 26 percent between states.  
Based on these observations, we offer results from a generalized least square 
regression (Table 4), where real informal wage is regressed on real FA, real VA and real RW 
after correcting for presence of heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Between 1984-85 and 
1989-90 (denoted as 1989-90 in Table 4), all the elements significantly explain changes in 
the informal real wage. Notably, the intercept term is negative. Admittedly, the explanatory 
power of the regression (Adjusted R-squares) analysis declines over time and it is lowest for 
the growth rates between 1994-95 and 1999-00, with the consequence that real VA alone is 
capable of explaining positively and significantly the growth in real informal wage. One can 
nevertheless observe from this cross-section that the informal wage has experienced shifts 
in both direction and magnitude between pre-reform and post-reform periods, as have been 
the factors deemed most responsible for its movements. For example, the growth in real 
rural wage affects the real informal wage negatively (and significantly) in the last period, 
unlike in the first three.  
Subsequently, we offer a pooled (or a pseudo panel) regression for these variables 
and report the findings in table 5. The panel regression initially tests for whether the fixed 
effects (FE) or the random effects (RE) model is consistent with the data, given that the 
FE/RE is the natural choice over the classical regression (CR) model since the value of the 
Lagrange Multiplier is very large. Further, between FE and RE the results from the Hausman 
Test suggests that FE is the appropriate model to use. Consequently, we use the 15 
methodology of Least Squares Dummy Variables after correcting for heteroscedasticity.
9 
According to this model however, the real FA and real RW are not significant, although the 
former shows a positive impact on real IW. On the other hand, real VA is positive and highly 
significant (at 1% level) in explaining the increase in real IW. The added information that this 
exercise offers is that, despite shifting importance attached to real FA and real VA in 
explaining real IW as witnessed from the cross-section regression results, the general trend 
seems to be that both real FA and real VA can explain growth in real IW positively. However, 
it also appears that the negative impact of the rural wage as observed during the last growth 
phase dominates the general trend. 
Finally, we offer results from the investigation into the existence of structural breaks 
in the real IW. To this extent, we use the standard Chow test and identify that there exists 
multiple structural breaks over the entire span of the period, including 1994-95, 1999-00 and 
2000-01 as the break years. Table 6 indicates that both the intercept and the slope have 
changed significantly over time. The graphical representation of the nature of the changes in 
the Annual Informal Wage Growth is given in figure 7. The graphical representation clearly 
shows the jumps and changes in both intercepts and slopes as we have discussed above. 
5.  Impact on Impact on Poverty and Further Evidence from Primary Survey 
This section reports one of the main results that has motivated the present exercise: 
the relationship between changes in informal wage in the different states and union 
territories in India and the changes in the percentage of people registered under the Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) category. The argument follows from the hypothesis that a large part of 
the urban poor in India works and lives in the so-called informal sector arrangements and 
that any improvement in the conditions of the informal workers can leave a significant and 
sustained impact on the incidence of poverty in the urban areas of the country. We 
subsequently test for the relationship between Urban Head Count Ratio (HCR) and the level 
of informal wage in the urban manufacturing units. The exercise is done in two stages: first, 
we regress the current period’s BPL percentage on previous periods’ Annual Informal Wage 
growth, where the results of the OLS suggest a negative relationship significant at 5 percent 
level (Table 7, Appendix II). Second, we run the analysis as a panel of the states and union 
territories, which reveals the presence of random effects and closely match that of the OLS 
results. However, as shown in table 8, the coefficient of IWPREV (real informal wage in the 
previous period) is still negative but now significant at 1 percent level. To summarize 
therefore, one may state that the effect of an improvement in the annual wage growth in the 
informal sector has negative and significant impact on the incidence of poverty across states 
                                                 
9 See Greene (2003) for details on the methodology.  16 
and union territories in India as per the data on the BPL category. In the next section we 
extend this analysis by considering the case of West Bengal. 
The secondary evidence was corroborated by a primary survey spanning the 
geographical boundaries of the state of West Bengal. A total number of 500 informal sector 
units (Non-Directory Manufacturing units and Own Account Enterprise), in four major 
industrial locations namely, Calcutta, Howrah, Durgapur and Siliguri, were surveyed in order 
to investigate the nature of the transition in the informal sector over the last decade.  
The data is collected through random sampling without replacement in the production 
units in the four locations mentioned above. Since most such informal units in India operate 
as household level trades, and resemble production organizations in agriculture, the 
dependent variable in our regression is the ‘Average Household Income for the current 
Period: 2000-05’ (Y). There are two primary dependent variables in this cross section 
sample: ‘the average stock of capital ownership/fixed assets between 2000-05’ (C) and ‘the 
per unit average price of the traded commodity between 2000-05’ (P).  
The sample is quite heterogeneous by informal occupational types of the 
respondents, and ranges from producers of iron safe, jewelry, machine tools, auto parts, to 
the worst possible cases of very low-paid maid servants. The survey is designed to report 
both manufacturing and own-account enterprises in roughly 60-40 ratios.  
We begin by giving some descriptive analyses of the data on the four locations, but 
for the sake of brevity we offer an example only.
10  The method applied is the following: We 
compare the household income of the respondents between pre-reform and post-reform 
periods. Figure 7a for example, reports the average (for the year 1991-05) income 
distribution in the city of Durgapur and is compared with that received on an average before 
1991. It shows that 53 percent of households involved with informal manufacturing units earn 
more in the post-reform period. Furthermore, if the comparison is that between the more 
recent period 2000-05 and the pre-1991 era, 58 percent of households in this category have 
been better off (Figure 7b). However, it is not self-evident from here that there is a one-to-
one correspondence with poverty, and that the improvement in household income 
necessarily reduces poverty.  
On the other hand, for the services category within the urban informal sector less 
households seem to have registered income growth compared to the preceding five years  
(see Figures 7c and 7d). We perform a similar exercise for Siliguri, Howrah, and Kolkata. 
While Howrah displays similar experiences for households engaged with manufacturing units 
in the informal sector, Kolkata and Siliguri show poor results for more recent periods for the 
                                                 
10 A detailed analysis and report on these patterns is available on the PEP website.  17 
same category. In fact, the trend in the service sector is similar almost everywhere, where 
the period ending in the year 2000 seems more prosperous than that ending in the year 
2005.  
Next we report the results from our regression analyses for the four locations under 
review. Based on the explanatory variables discussed above we try to explain the changes 
in the household income for these places. It is to be noted however that conditions in 
Howrah have undergone such a rapid transformation that most respondents – be it in the 
manufacturing units or in the service units – report little or no new capital expenditure for the 
period between 2000 and 2005. We are therefore compelled to use the capital stock that 
they report for the immediately preceding period as the explanatory variable in place of the 
current capital stock that we use for all the other locations. The results are given in tables 
11-14 in Appendix II. Interestingly, the level of current capital stock significantly explains the 
positive surge in household income for most locations, although the price per unit turns out 
to be a poor explanatory variable in predicting the same. Obviously, there is no direct 
implication for the effect of household income on poverty for any of these locations. We use 
the household income and its determinants as an alternative to explain if there has been any 
transformation in the whole situation concerning the status of informal workers in the 
manufacturing as well as in the services sector.  
Thus, the results from the primary survey must be taken with caution in formulating 
any policy measure towards improving the condition of informal workers in the state or in the 
country. There is undoubtedly a need for further research in this category in favor of a 
clearer understanding of the nature of transformation in the informal sector in general. 
Nonetheless, the present study should serve as an important step in this direction not only 
because of its broader view on the subject, but also because of its identification of such 
aspects as capital mobility and its impact on informal wage, which had previously been 
completely overlooked. 
6. Concluding  remarks 
The purpose of this paper has been to look into the impact of trade reform policies on 
informal wage in a typical developing economy. The fact that poor informal workers must find 
employment for survival allows us to use a full-employment model in a general equilibrium 
setting. By using a generalized theoretical construct we have proposed and demonstrated 
that a crucial factor, which determines the wage-employment status of the existing informal 
workers, is the degree of capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors. As the 
formal sector contracts due to tariff liberalization and retrenched workers crowd into the 
informal sector for employment, informal wage does not necessarily fall. If capital also starts 18 
moving into the informal sector, it is quite likely that informal wage will rise provided the 
degree of capital mobility is not very low. This tends to go against the argument that more 
employment in the informal sector signifies lower wage for the average informal worker. We 
have characterized the cases with perfect and zero mobility of capital demonstrating two 
extreme situations. Modeling the degree of capital mobility explicitly in an otherwise simple 
general equilibrium structure clearly establishes the result. 
The empirical section is however, not a direct test of the theoretical results for 
reasons mentioned above. Instead, we use data from the informal sector in India to reflect 
on the testable hypothesis in an exploratory sense. The informal sector in India has 
registered an annual increase in real wages by 15-20 percent during the post-reform 
decade. At the same time, there have been substantial increments in the real fixed assets 
and real value added in the sector. We show that both these factors, as well as the real rural 
wage in the country, explain growth in the real informal wage positively and significantly for 
most of the time periods under consideration.  
The accumulation of real fixed assets in the informal sector corresponds with 
declining real capital stock in the formal sector, which in our case exemplifies the issue of 
capital mobility discussed above. Interestingly, the growth of fixed assets in the informal 
sector convincingly outweighs the growth of fixed capital stock in the organized sector in the 
post-reform phase. In the absence of data on the path that each unit of capital follows as and 
when relocated, this is used as a proxy measure.  
The message that this study intends to drive at is simple and clear. If one has to 
study the impact of reform on labor markets, one has to look at the working of the capital 
market as well. While greater employment in the informal sector can be a sign of both 
poverty and prosperity, the true outcomes are distinctly visible only when the role of the 
capital market is also taken into consideration. To make the problem a meaningful exercise, 
we checked whether a substantial rise in capital stock in informal manufacturing is consistent 
with a phase of either a meager or a negative growth of fixed capital stock in the organized 
manufacturing sector.  
As an extension one could bring agriculture into the picture with mobile labor and 
fixed supply of land. It is also possible to show how profitability in agriculture can influence 
the informal wage with or without capital mobility, an exercise which is undoubtedly relevant 
for the developing economies. Thus, the analysis should also be useful for cross-country 
empirical studies in the future.  
We have kept the commodity prices fixed by the small country assumption. 
Alternatively, one can introduce a homothetic demand function and, with the elasticity of 19 
substitution in demand crossing a critical threshold, all our results will hold. One may argue 
that we have ignored the ‘non-traded’ characteristic of the informal sector. However, it 
follows from our basic model that bringing in a second informal sector producing a non-
traded good does not add much to the results. If capital is highly mobile, tariff reform must 
increase the informal wage and reduce the return to capital. The price of the non-traded 
good can move in any direction. Finally, the impact on the informal wage should remain the 
same, qualitatively. 
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Appendix I 
Proof of condition (10) 
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Appendix II 
Figure 4 























































1984-85 to 1989-90 1989-90 to  1994-95 1994-95 to  1999-00
1999-00 to  2000-01 Post Reform Average
 
Source: NSS Reports, various rounds and own calculations 
List of abbreviations for states and union territories in India : AP – Andhra Pradesh, AS – Assam, BH – Bihar, GJ – Gujarat, HY – Haryana 
  HP – Himachal Pradesh, KA – Karnataka, KE – Kerala, MP – Madhya Pradesh 
  MH – Maharastra, OR – Orissa, PN – Punjab, RJ – Rajasthan, TN – Tamil Nadu 
  TR – Tripura, UP – Uttar Pradesh, WB – West Bengal, AN – Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
  Ch – Chandigarh, DN – Dadra and Nagar Haveli, DH – Delhi, LA – Lakshadweep 
  PO – Pondicherry, GO – Goa, JK – Jammu and Kashmir, MA – Manipur 
  ME – Meghalaya, MI – Mizoram, NA – Nagaland, SI - Sikkim. 25 
Figure 5 




























84-85 89-90(F) 89-90 94-95(F) 94-95 99-00(F)
84-85 89-90(I) 89-90 94-95(I) 94-95 99-00(I)
 
F – Formal Sector, I – Informal Sector.  

























Table 1. Table showing annual growth rates of real informal wage for states and union 









2000-01 Post Reform Average
AP  -14.9383 38.37914 0.351421 5.54216 14.75757
AS  -12.5909 9.400387 0.502013 19.94701 9.949804
BH  -12.4796 9.259229 -0.91022 37.41843 15.25582
GJ  -8.01461 5.856186 3.761828 9.471879 6.363298
HY  -15.417 23.39205 -4.11872 33.07289 17.44874
HP  -11.5206 -0.34082 3.509483 24.55454 9.241068
KA  -12.8237 21.54953 7.021524 13.43834 14.00313
KE  -14.8953 12.55645 2.686628 21.20452 12.1492
MP  -12.6123 22.41174 1.455013 13.11878 12.32851
MH  -6.4 9.7482 5.247609 11.28708 8.760962
OR  -13.1553 22.78583 -2.38878 33.1919 17.86298
PN  -15.1443 12.20414 -1.06954 44.061 18.39853
RJ  -15.4959 32.53101 -1.34439 33.03571 21.40744
TN  -10.1074 6.406688 14.13201 11.49062 10.67644
TR  -14.3066 14.89337 -5.45877 45.36927 18.26796
UP  -13.2014 18.00436 -1.58454 26.79013 14.40332
WB  -11.2556 11.41085 -7.25447 15.29931 6.485231
AN  14.62978 3.202789 2.910365 6.914311
CH  19.21098 5.496664 12.4677 12.39178
DN  9.828439 -4.01589 37.7676 14.52672
DH  13.26679 20.39249 12.10498 15.25476
LA  -0.21334 9.929694 7.832409 5.849589
PO  20.77112 -3.96475 -18.5548 -0.58281
GO  20.50309 0.947838 23.74566 15.06553
JK  20.71262 2.838103 33.64066 19.06379
MA  24.9116 -4.18481 26.83254 15.85311
ME  18.91503 -5.28746 33.57459 15.73405
MI  19.93168 -6.92451 24.69716 12.56811
NA  15.62657 -1.96228 25.16228 12.94219
SI  28.81384 -0.01264 42.15758 23.65293






















































IW_89-90 IW_94-95 IW_1999-2000 IW_2000-2001
Annual Growth rate of Informal Wage between 1984-85 and 2000-01 27 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the variables (Year-Wise) 
Year 
Variables Mean  SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Observations 
IW (-)  15.08  3.45 0.97 3.16 (-) 18.96 (-) 6.75  17
FA 4.71  9.29 0.54 3.18 (-) 10.75 26.92  17
VA (-)  7.90  7.12 1.20 4.20 (-) 19.04 10.00  17
1989-90 
RW  (-) 7.56  3.48 (-) 0.13 1.94 (-) 14.38 (-) 2.80  17
IW 20.72  10.97 0.22 3.03 (-) 0.43 47.97  30
FA 3.23  12.93 1.36 5.99 (-) 19.28 47.98  30
VA 5.89  13.31 1.98 7.94 (-) 12.24 56.44  30
1994-95 
RW 8.03  6.94 (-)  0.37 2.90 (-) 8.23 20.73  28
IW 1.29  7.65 1.26 4.76 (-) 9.07 25.49  30
FA 58.50  50.32 1.35 4.16 (-) 13.24 208.01  30
VA 42.05  32.67 1.47 4.93 3.48 140.38 30
1999-2000 
RW 5.91  13.94 0.08 2.71 (-) 25.00 37.93  30
IW 44.18  28.51 (-)  0.52 3.30 (-) 37.11 90.74  30
FA (-)  10.52  35.77 0.87 4.19 (-) 69.15 99.74  30
VA (-)  40.18  25.04 0.82 4.42 (-) 94.69 26.49  30
2000-2001 
RW (-)  2.07  17.17 2.22 7.34 (-) 19.91 58.87  29
IW 16.16  26.84 0.81 3.20 (-) 37.11 90.74  107
FA 15.10  43.33 1.69 7.54 (-) 69.15 208.01  107
VA 0.92  38.68 0.59 4.54 (-) 94.69 140.38  107
All years 
RW 2.13  13.52 1.12 5.14 (-) 25.00 58.87  104
Description of the variables:   IW = Annual Growth rate of real informal wage 
        FA = Annual Growth rate of real fixed assets 
        VA = Annual Growth rate of real value-added 
        RW = Annual Growth rate of real rural wage 
Table 3. Correlation coefficient matrix (Year-Wise) 
1989-90  IW FA VA  RW 
IW 1.00000 .42767 .57368 .27155 
FA .42767 1.00000 .37750 -.09812 
VA .57368 .37750 1.00000 -.03692 
RW .27155 -.09812 -.03692 1.00000 
 
1994-95  IW FA VA RW 
IW 1.00000 .33932 .27046 .28607 
FA .33932 1.00000 .04867 .00108 
VA .27046 .04867 1.00000 .17476 
RW .28607 .00108 .17476 1.00000 
 
1999-2000  IW FA VA RW 
IW 1.00000 .06356 .35441 .14441 
FA .06356 1.00000 .13441 -.38761 
VA .35441 .13441 1.00000 -.07614 
RW .14441 -.38761 -.07614 1.00000 
 
2000-2001  IW FA VA RW 
IW 1.00000 .15125 .54512 -.15355 
FA .15125 1.00000 -.20262 .16064 
VA .54512 -.20262 1.00000 .02964 
RW -.15355 .16064 .02964 1.00000 28 
Table 4. Regression results for individual time-points corrected for heteroscadasticity 
METHODOLOGY: Generalized Least Squares 
Dependent variable: Annual Growth Rate of IW 
Year  Exp. 
Variables 
Coeff. t-ratio R
2 Adj.  R
2  AIC LL 
CONSTANT 
(-) 11.35 (-) 6.70473*
FA  0.102 2.58869*
VA  0.233 5.09886*
1989-90 
RW  0.313 1.73243**
0.48 0.36 5.01 (-)  39.10
CONSTANT  15.89 8.84668*
FA  0.278 2.19006*
VA  0.183 1.74465**
1994-95 
RW  0.354 1.89854**
0.23 0.14 7.59 (-)  109.98
CONSTANT  (-) 3.76 (-) 1.62243
FA  0.014 0.45872
VA  0.083 2.04059**
1999-2000 
RW  0.114 0.98769
0.16 0.06 6.961 (-)  100.42
CONSTANT  69.56 5.69114*
FA  0.152 0.86366
VA  0.607 2.23908*
2000-2001 
RW  (-) 0.307 (-) 2.30538*
0.30 0.23 9.41 (-)  137.09
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level & ** denotes significance at 10% level 
  A d j .   R
2 = adjusted R
2 
  AIC  =  Akaike  Information  Criterion 
  LL = Log-likelihood  29 






















Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i)  
Methodology: 2-step GLS 
            | Estimates:  Var [e]              =   .251075D+03  
            |                    Var [u]              =   .145978D+04   
            |               Corr [v(i, t),v(i, s)] =   .853246     
            | Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 157.18 (1 df, prob value =  .000000) 
            | (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model.)  
            | Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman)     = 2.07 (3 df, prob value =  .558458) 
            | (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM).)        
            | Reestimated using GLS coefficients:  
            | Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .251113D+03   
            |                    Var[u]              =   .304627D+04   
            |               Sum of Squares          .106765D+06   
            |                   R-squared              -.398626D+00   
 
⇒RE model is inconsistent, which leads us to use a Fixed Effects Model. The results from the LSDV 
(group Dummy) model is given below.  
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables  
| Ordinary least squares regression    Weighting variable = none 
| Dependent variable = REALIW   Mean= 16.16169250, S.D.= 26.83556242  
| Model size: Observations = 107, Parameters = 7, Deg. Fr.= 100  
| Residuals:  Sum of squares= 25107.46507, Std. Dev = 15.84534  
| Fit:        R-squared=  .671091, Adjusted R-squared =  .65136  
| Model test: F [6, 100] = 34.01, Probability value = .00000  
| Diagnostic: Log-L =   -443.8343, Restricted (b=0) Log-L =    -503.3250  
| Log Amemiya Probability Criterion. = 5.589, Akaike Info. Criterion = 8.427  
| Estd. Autocorrelation of e (i, t)     .139228  
White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrix used. 
 
Results from Heteroscedasticty-corrected Panel (Fixed Effects) Regression  
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t-ratio 
REALFA 0.030422  0.049421  0.616 
REALVA 0.256675**  0.070371  3.647 
REALRW -0.04538  0.160961  -0.282 
** Significant at 1% level30 
Table 6. Identifying structural breaks  
  Years  
Exp. 
Variables Coeff.  t-ratio 
1989-90 & 1994-95  FA  (-) 0.03  (-) 0.13698
Checking for structural breaks at 1994-95  VA 0.546  1.85573
  RW 1.22  2.92752
T2 = INTERCEPT DUMMY   T2 16.00  4.26033*
FA2 = T2 INTERACTS WITH FA   FA2 0.396  1.05172
VA2 = T2 INTERACTS WITH VA  VA2 0.064  0.154686
RW2 = T2 INTERACTS WITH RW  RW2  (-) 1.04  (-) 1.8349
    
1994-95 & 1999-2000  FA 0.397  2.41241
Checking for structural breaks at 1999-00  VA 0.309  1.91503
  RW 1.41  6.34088
T3 = INTERCEPT DUMMY   T3  (-) 3.76  (-) 0.81685
FA3 = T3 INTERACTS WITH FA   FA3  (-) 0.383  (-) 2.23524*
VA3 = T3INTERACTS WITH VA  VA3  (-) 0.226  (-) 1.29278
RW3 = T3 INTERACTS WITH RW  RW3  (-) 1.29  (-) 4.64913*
     
1999-2000 & 2000-2001  FA  (-) 0.008  (-) 0.14337
Checking for structural breaks at 2000-01  VA 0.054  0.611483
  RW 0.052  0.220547
T4 = INTERCEPT DUMMY   T4 69.56  10.3654*
FA4 = T4 INTERACTS WITH FA   FA4 0.160  1.4042
VA4 = T4INTERACTS WITH VA  VA4 0.553  3.37302*
RW4 = T4 INTERACTS WITH RW  RW4  (-) 0.359  (-) 1.15813
Dependent variable = Annual Growth Rate of IW 
Table 7. Regressing current period’s BPL percentage on previous year’s annual 
growth of informal wage 
Dependent variable: BPLPER 
Methodology: OLS 
Exp. Variables  Coeff. t-ratio R
2  AIC  Log - Likelihood 
IWPREV  (-) 0.236 (-) 2.57*
CONSTANT 27.85 14.53* 
0.13 7.883 (-) 183.2454 
Note: BPLPER = BPL percentage 
IWPREV = Previous year’s growth rate of informal wage 31 
Table 8. Unbalanced panel regression of current period’s BPL percentage on previous 
year’s annual growth of informal wage 
Dependent variable: BPLPER 
Model: Random Effects Model 
Exp. Variables  Coeff. t-ratio 
IWPREV  (-) 0.229  (-) 5.17* 
CONSTANT 27.12  11.98* 
Diagnostics tests for the model: 
 
Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)      
Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .253153D+02   
              Var[u]              =   .129246D+03   
              Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] =   .836212       
 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman)     =     .01  
(1 df, prob value =  .940154)                    
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM).)         
Reestimated using GLS coefficients:               
Estimates:    Var[e]              =   .253158D+02   
              Var[u]              =   .129353D+03   
              Sum of Squares          .672385D+04   
             R-squared               .124856D+00   
Note: BPLPER = BPL percentage 
IWPREV = Previous year’s growth rate of informal wage 
Figure 7a  Figure 7b 
Durgapur--- Manufacturing
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Figure 7c  Figure 7d 
Table 11.  Results of primary survey in Kolkata (Manufacturing Units) 
Kolkata 
Panel A  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum  Max. 
No of 
Cases 
Y  37646.3 23061.1  0.967373  4.13229  3000  112000  57 
C  8360.7 9685.38  1.23772  3.42979  240  35000  57 
P  106.368 150.419  2.16753  9.08813  0.5  801  57 
 
Panel B   Regression Results 
 METHODOLOGY: Ordinary Least Squares 
 Dependent Variable: Annual Informal Household Income  
  Coefficient  Standard Error   t-ratio  P-value 
Constant  27942.6 4036.74  6.92206  4.66E-09 
C  0.77643 0.336021  2.31066  0.024559 
P  2.66432 12.9908  0.205093  0.838243 
# C – Fixed Capital Stock; P – Price per unit; Y – Annual Household Income 
Durgapur--- Services
Persons better-off (on basis of annual 
household income) in 1991-2005 in 





        
Durgapur--- Services
Persons better-off (on basis of 
annual household income) in 2000-05 


















Table 13. Results of primary survey in Durgapur (Manufacturing Units) 
Durgapur 
Panel A  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Skewness Kurtosis Minimum  Max. 
No of 
Cases 
Y  39247.8 27293.2  0.707129  2.91077  1350  110000  48 
C  150491 307651  2.2216  6.11462  700 1.00E+06  48 
P  965.34 1837.46  2.19362  7.171  1.5  7935  48 
 
Panel B   Regression Results 
 METHODOLOGY: Ordinary Least Squares 
 Dependent Variable: Annual Informal Household Income  
  Coefficient  Standard Error   t-ratio  P-value 
Constant  32000.1 4889.38  6.54483  3.95E-08 
C  0.012638 0.016261  0.777216  0.440926 
P  2.26698 2.25657  1.00462  0.320226 
# C – Fixed Capital Stock; P – Price per unit  
Howrah 
Panel A  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum  Max. 
No of 
Cases 
Y  48421.1 13728.2  0.637803  2.5228  30000  80000  60 
C  47342.9 22493.1  0.478837  2.87829  7000  100000  60 
P  1022.15 2101.96  5.03217  33.2572  6  15000  60 
 
Panel B   Regression Results 
 METHODOLOGY: Ordinary Least Squares 
 Dependent Variable: Annual Informal Household Income  
  Coefficient  Standard Error   t-ratio  P-value 
Constant  39146.4 2896.04  13.5172  0 
C  0.250499 0.070518  3.55227 0.000775 
P  -0.00985 0.989081  -0.00996  0.992087 34 
Table 14. Results of primary survey in Siliguri (Manufacturing Units) 
Siliguri 
Panel A  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness  Kurtosis Minimum  Max. 
No of 
Cases 
Y  37978 23854.8  2.18232 8.73795  3600  144000  100 
C  23708.8 68809.5  5.53408  35.901  100  500000 100 
P  610.042 1795.99  5.9622  45.7833  0.35  15250  100 
 
Panel B   Regression Results 
 METHODOLOGY: Ordinary Least Squares 
 Dependent Variable: Annual Informal Household Income  
  Coefficient  Standard Error   t-ratio  P-value 
Constant  34360 2183.5  15.7362  0 
C  0.191685 0.049122  3.90224 0.000176 
P  0.965398 1.58032  0.610887  0.542703 
 